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COMMENTS
FROM DENVER TO DAYTON: THE
EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE IN NORTHERN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION LITIGATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1954, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Brown
v. Board of Education' and the modern era of school desegregation
litigation began. The essence of the Brown holding was that equal
protection of the laws is synonymous with the right to equal educational opportunity and that segregated education is "inherently
unequal." ' Since that landmark decision, hundreds of school systems have been embroiled in lawsuits alleging a denial of the equal
educational opportunity guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.'
In the years between 1954 and 1968, attempts to desegregate
schools in the Deep South were met with strong resistance, and
numerous techniques to avoid implementing the Supreme Court's
mandate were developed.' Southern district courts interpreted
Brown as narrowly as possible, adopting the view that the Constitution "does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination."' 5 Accordingly, most federal district courts were satisfied with
remedies which merely forbade the exclusion of Blacks from white
schools. As a result of the district courts' unwillingness to take effective action, the burden of implementing the mandate of Brown fell
primarily upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court, with
little guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the mechanics of
desegregation, attempted to define uniform standards. In the process, the court declared that Brown I and Brown IP required not
only an end to state-mandated segregation but also included an
affirmative duty to integrate southern schools.
Despite the efforts of the Fifth Circuit, however, progress to1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Brown 1).
2. Id. at 495.
3. "Nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
4. See Read, JudicialEvolution of the Law of School Integrationsince Brown v. Board
of Education, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 11-28 (Winter 1975) (hereinafter cited as Read).
5. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (three judge court).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Brown I1).
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ward desegregation was slow. Finally, in 1968, the Supreme Court
evidenced its impatience by declaring that "[t]he burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." 7 No
longer would the mere adoption of a voluntary freedom-ofenrollment policy suffice. "'Freedom of choice' is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a constitutionally required end-the
abolition of a system of segregation and its effects . . . . [I]f it
fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve this
end." 8 Substantial progress followed this pronouncement.
In 1971, the Supreme Court provided further definition, in more
precise terms, of the scope of duty of school authorities in implementing Brown. The primary objective should be to "eliminate from
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation," the
Court declared in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education.' "Once a right and violation have been shown, the scope
of the district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."' The task facing a court in designing a remedy is to correct,
"by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution . . . .As with any equity case,
the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.""
The Court reiterated the very important indicia of a segregated
system that had been described in Green v. School Board of New
Kent County: 2 existing policy and practices with regard to faculty,
staff, transportation, extra curricular activities, and facilities.'"
Amplifying on these, the Court declared that "where it is possible
to identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply by reference
to the racial composition of teachers . . . the quality of school
buildings . . . , or the organization of sports activities, a prima
facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights . . . is
shown."' 4 It was also noted that the decision involved in selecting
sites for new school construction was most important because it
might "influence the patterns of residential development . . . and
7. Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
8. Id. at 440, quoting Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Sobeloff, J. concurring).
9. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 16.
12. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
13. 402 U.S. at 18, referring to 391 U.S. at 435.
14. 402 U.S. at 18.
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have important impact on the racial composition of inner city
neighborhoods."'"
Whereas the existence of "some small number"'" of one-race
schools in a district is not in and of itself proof of segregative practices, in a system with "a history of segregation,"' 7 there is "a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in
their racial composition."'' 8 In order to rebut that presumption,
school boards must show that such disproportionate racial composition "is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on
their part."'"
The Court concluded that in designing an effective remedy for
unconstitutional segregation, more than a neutral student assignment plan is necessary. It is permissible to pair and group noncontiguous schools and to require school authorities to employ bus
transportation. 10
Following Green and Swann, massive integration came to
southern school systems. By 1975, it could be said that "[tihe
federal judiciary's desegregation efforts in the South are now largely
complete . . . . The school litigation that continues to trouble the
federal courts in the South is confined primarily to methods of imdesegregation orders in the region's large metroplementing existing
' '2
areas.
politan
As a result, national attention is now focused on the North, as
many of its major cities are still involved in the preliminary stages
of desegregation litigation. Recent Supreme Court decisions have
adapted the standards created in the context of southern cases to
the different factual situations found in northern cities where, at
least in recent history, segregation could not be attributed to discriminatory state laws.
In addition to adapting the existing standards, the Court has
also developed new standards to meet the particular requirements
of northern desegregation cases. As will become apparent, there has
been considerable confusion and uncertainty in the lower courts as
to the meaning of these standards. The result has been a lack of
decisional uniformity, and the Supreme Court has frequently va15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28-30.
Read, supra note 4, at 47.
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cated judgments on the grounds of misapplication of the appropriate legal standards.
In an attempt to clarify the apparent ambiguity, the Supreme
Court recently has defined, in progressively more precise language,
the elements required both for the initial determination of a constitutional violation and for the subsequently required remedy. Analysis of the most recent decisions of the Court, however, indicates
more than a mere clarification of the applicable standards. It also
indicates a shift by the Court from the broad interpretation of legal
precedent seen in Keyes v. School District No. 1,22 the first major
northern desegregation case, to a restrictive view not only of prior
decisions but also of the evidentiary requirements which are necessary for an initial finding of de jure segregation.
Moreover, this restrictive approach is reflected in the guidelines
enunciated in the recent Supreme Court decision, Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman,23 for determining the proper scope of a
remedy.
Whereas Keyes was seen as having "the potential to sweep
through the North overturning school systems as dramatically as
Swann has in the South,"" subsequent developments in desegregation doctrine, announced by the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis,2 5 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.," and Dayton warrant a predication that it will be
the rare circumstance, indeed, in which massive desegregation orders requiring extensive pupil transportation will survive judicial
review.
II.

KEYES: "UNLOCKING THE NORTHERN SCHOOLHOUSE

DOORS ' ' 27

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 was the first school desegregation
case to reach the Supreme Court which involved a major city outside the Deep South. Unlike the southern cases, in which segregation had been mandated or permitted by state law, the Denver case
involved an allegation that the school board had created and maintained racially segregated schools "by the use of various techniques
such as manipulation of student attendance zones, schoolsite selec22.
23.
24.
Doors, 9
Doors).
25.
26.
27.

413 U.S. 189 (1973).
97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977).
Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse
Hnav. Civ. RIGHTS Civ. LiB. REv. 124, 151 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Schoolhouse
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Schoolhouse Doors, supra note 22.
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tion and a neighborhood school policy .. . ."I' The desired remedy
was a decree directing desegregation of the entire school system.29
The Supreme Court retained the distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation created in the southern cases. There is no
constitutional violation in a segregated school system if the school
board has in no way created or maintained segregation. That condition may be termed de facto segregation. It is only segregation which
has been created by intentional state action, that is, dejure segregation, which is constitutionally prohibited. "We emphasize that the
differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de
facto segregation. . . is purpose or intent to segregate." 30 Therefore,
the plaintiffs in Keyes were required to prove not only that segregated schooling existed but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional school board action.
The district court determined that the facts adduced showed
clear patterns of segregation in the Park Hills section of the school
district reinforced by official action which was knowing and purposeful. 3' The court found that the tendency of the school board to
concentrate minority teachers in minority schools helped to seal
them off as permanent segregated schools.32 In addition, the school
authorities had opened Barrett School in a segregated area in 1960
with the conscious knowledge that it would be segregated, which it
remained at the time of trial. 3
The most important discriminatory act of the school board was
the rescission of three resolutions which had been passed to promote
integration. The school superintendent had made preliminary efforts to implement the resolutions when, as a result of a change in
the composition of the school board following an election, they were
rescinded. The court found that the majority of the board had acted
officially to reject the integrative effort and to restore and perpetuate segregation. "[Tlhere can be no gainsaying the purpose and
effect of the action as one designed to segregate." 34 As authority for
its finding, the court cited Reitman v. Mulkey 3 in which the Su28. 413 U.S. at 191.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 208.
31. 303 F. Supp. 279, 284 (D. Colo. 1969).
32. Id. at 284-85.
33. Id. at 285.
34. Id.
35. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The constitutional amendment passed by the California legislature established the right of a private person to discriminate on racial grounds in real estate
transactions. By passing this amendment, the legislature repealed two laws which prohibited
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preme Court struck down a California constitutional amendment
which repealed a positive action encouraging integration. The
amendment was unconstitutional because it effectively authorized
discrimination by reestablishing the segregated conditions previously in existence. 6
The segregative intent of the school board did not "include
malicious or odious intent" but it was "action which was taken with
knowledge of the consequences, and the consequences were not
merely possible, they were substantially certain. Under such conditions the action is unquestionably willful. '37 The rescission was
therefore unconstitutional.3 8
. The Supreme Court, in discussing the scope of the violation,
observed that the deliberate racial segregation in the Park Hills
section, attended by approximately 38 percent of Denver's total
Negro school population, involved more than "an insubstantial or
trivial fragment of the school system. ' 39 Therefore, the Court criticized both the district court and the court of appeals for their failure
to apply the correct legal standard in evaluating the significance of
this finding. The district court had held that the intentional segregation in Park Hills did not prove an intentional segregative policy
in other sections of the school district. The standard they applied
required proof of de jure segregation for each area that the plaintiff
sought to desegregate.
Disagreeing with this approach, the Court declared that it had
never suggested that plaintiffs had to bear the burden of proving the
elements of dejure segregation "as to each and every school." 40 The
Court then defined the correct legal standard for determining the
scope of the violation in situations where a statutory dual system
has never existed; i.e., a standard for northern desegregation cases:
We hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case,
creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie
case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities
racial discrimination in the sale of housing. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional
amendment officially authorized racial discrimination and was therefore unconstitutional.
387 U.S. at 376-78, 380-81.
36. 303 F. Supp. at 288 n.9.
37. Id. at 286.
38. Id. at 288.
39. 413 U.S. at 199.
40. Id. at 200.
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and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally
segregative actions."
If the school board is unable to rebut this presumption and it is
found that a dual school system exists, the board then assumes an
affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system root and branch.
The majority opinion noted that Justice Rehnquist, in dissent,
disagreed that an affirmative duty to integrate is imposed in such
a situation. Justice Rehnquist maintained that Brown merely prohibited discrimination. In response, the majority opinion observed
that this view, embodied in Briggs v. Elliott,42 had been rejected by
the Supreme Court in Green, which held that Brown II required
school boards operating dual systems to take whatever steps were
necessary to convert to a unitary school system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. "Green remains
the governing principle."4
As support for the presumption that deliberate racial discrimination in one area of a school system has system wide impact, the
4 of building
Court described the "substantial reciprocal effect[s]'
a school with the conscious knowledge that it would be segregated,
of assigning faculty on a racial basis and other decisions with segregative impact, on the "racial composition of residential neighborhoods . . . thereby causing further racial concentration within the
schools."4 5 Due to this strong reciprocal effect, it is only common
sense to conclude that a finding of discriminatory action in a substantial portion of a school district "is the necessary predicate for a
finding of. . . a dual school system." 6
The Court remanded the case, ordering the district court to
determine whether or not the Denver school system was a dual one.
If so, then the board had an affirmative duty to desegregate the
entire system. If not, then the school board would have the opportunity to rebut the prima facie case in the core city schools raised
47
by the finding of intentional segregation in the Park Hills schools.
41. Id. at 208.
42. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (three judge court), see discussion note 5 supra
and accompanying text.
43. 413 U.S. at 200 n.ll.
44. Id. at 202.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 201. The Court quoted Judge Wisdom's statement that "[infection at one
school infects all schools." Id. n.11, quoting United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d
848, 888 (5th Cir. 1972).
47. 413 U.S. at 213.
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The board's burden would be to show that its various practices and
policies "considered together . . . either were not taken in effectuation of a policy to create or maintain segregation . . . or, if unsuccessful in that effort, were not factors in causing the existing condition of segregation in these schools."48
The Keyes decision provided the lower courts with an example
of the way in which the standards created in Brown, Green and
Swann were applicable to northern desegregation litigation. Moreover, it created a new standard for determining the scope of a constitutional violation in situations where a dual system had not been
created by statute.
Although the de jure/defacto distinction of the earlier decisions
was retained and the "meaningful portion" element of the new standard remained undefined, the effect of Keyes was to provide northern litigants with "an extremely powerful weapon"49 in the form of
the Keyes presumption. Plaintiffs now merely needed to prove localized de jure segregation to trigger the presumption of a systemwide
violation. For an issue as intangible and difficult to prove as intent,
the allocation of the burden becomes determinative. And the burden now allocated to defendant school authorities to prove lack of
intent promised to be even heavier than the preliminary requirement for plaintiffs to prove intent in a "meaningful portion" of the
school system.
The critical stage in northern litigation thus became the initial
finding of segregative intent. Because of the extreme difficulty of
proving that segregative intent was not among the factors motivating school board actions, a finding of localized discrimination would
almost always result in a finding of a systemwide violation which
would require a systemwide remedy.
Following Keyes, it soon became apparent that the plaintiffs'
success or failure in the critical early stages of litigation depended
on the evidentiary standard, either subjective or objective, adopted
by a particular lower court to determine segregative intent. As a
result of the ambiguity in the phrase "meaningful portion", the
lower courts were given the additional discretion to determine when
that degree of segregative impact had been reached.
Predictably, some lower courts defined the requisite quantum
of intent restrictively. The fact that school boards knowingly continued policies which had segregative effect was not enough to prove
48.
49.

Id. at 214.
Schoolhouse Doors, supra note 22, at 155.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss1/7

19781

COMMENT

segregative intent.5 9 Other courts, however, were willing to find intent when it was shown that the board was aware of the segregative
5
effect of their policies or actions. Some courts were willing to go
even further. Applying an objective test, intent was found where the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of a board's action or inaction
5
were segregative in effect. " Following Keyes, in cases of the latter
variety, plaintiffs could not only utilize the Keyes presumption of
systemwide impact once a constitutional violation was established,
but also, to assist in that initial finding, they had the benefit of a
presumption that school board actions having foreseeable segregative impact were intentional. One case in which this presumption
was adopted and which also provides a clear example of the way in
Tex. 1971)
50. United States v. Midland Indep. School Dist., 334 F. Supp. 147 (W.D.
repeatedly
rev'd 519 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 910 (1976) (district court
v. RiStates
United
blacks);
and
Mexican-Americans
against
discrimination
find
failed to
plaintiffs
denied
court
(district
1975)
Cir.
chardson Indep. School Dist., 512 F.2d 896 (5th
black
relief because the one all-black school in this Dallas suburb with a three-percent
F.2d
503
Jose,
San
v.
Ybarra
factors);
geographic
population was segregated due to neutral
Mich. 1973), aff'd
1041 (9th Cir. 1974); Higgins v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444 (W.D.
Mo. 1975); Zamora v.
508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Jennings, 399 F. Supp. 322 (E.D.
remanded 519 F.2d
New Braunfels Indep. School Dist., 362 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Tex. 1973),
segregation).
facto
de
only
found
had
court
(district
1084 (5th Cir. 1975)
schools
A pre-Keyes case which is often cited for the proposition that de facto segregated
(S.D. Ohio
572
Supp.
F.
244
Educ.,
of
Bd.
Cincinnati
v.
Deal
is
are not unconstitutional
In Deal, the racial
1965), aff'd 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
school policy
neighborhood
a
of
result
the
be
to
held
was
schools
Cincinnati
the
in
imbalance
also Downs
See
60.
at
F.2d
369
placement."
pupil
of
which was merely "the normal method
914 (1965).
v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 380 U.S.
Morgan v.
51. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), afl'd sub nom.
court stated
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1963 (1975). The district
with intent to bring
that the paramount issue was whether the Boston school board acted
was certain, or
about or continue segregation or "with knowledge that such segregation
Bradley v. Milliken,
478.
at
Supp.
F.
379
actions."
their
from
result
to
certain,
substantially
484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
(1974).
717
U.S.
418
grounds,
other
on
rev'd
1973),
found intentional
This is essentially the test applied by the district court in Keyes which
and the
discrimination in "action which was taken with the knowledge of the consequences,
at 286.
Supp.
F.
303
certain."
substantially
were
they
possible,
consequences were not merely
The Supreme Court approved this language, 413 U.S. at 201-02.
United States
52. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 523 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976);
(1975); Hart
946
U.S.
432
denied,
cert.
1975),
v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.
Kalamazoo Bd. of
v.
Oliver
1975);
Cir.
(2d
37
F.2d
512
Educ.,
of
Bd.
School
v. Community
State Bd. of
Educ. 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Oliver v. Michigan
Cisneros v. Corpus
(1975);
963
U.S.
421
denied,
cert.
1974),
Cir.
(6th
178
F.2d
508
Educ.,
U.S. 922 (1973);
Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413
aff'd 443 F.2d 573 (6th
Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970),
(W.D. Pa. 1971), 359
Cir. 1971); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 820
F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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which a lower court's definition of intent is outcome determinative
is United States v. School District of Omaha."
III. OMAHA AND THE FORESEEABILITY TEST
In Omaha, the district court, in 1974, adopted a restrictive
approach which defined intent in essentially subjective terms, using
such words as "deliberate" and "intentionally discriminated." That
court interpreted the heavy emphasis placed on intent by the Keyes
decision to require more than a mere foreseeability test.54 Instead,
it found that the natural and foreseeable consequences of school
board actions are neither determinative nor immaterial, "but rather
constitute one additional factor to be weighed in evaluating the
defendants' bverall intent."55
This view permitted the court to conclude that the record
"simply does not justify the finding. . . that the school
authorities
• . .intentionally discriminated against minority students by practicing a deliberate policy of racial segregation." 5 6 This conclusion
was possible despite a showing by plaintiffs of intentionally discriminatory policies since the effects of those policies were not
"substantial.""5 For example, the court dismissed
evidence that a
very small number of black teachers were employed by the school
district in 1960, offered as proof of racial discrimination in hiring
practices, by attributing the small number to a probable scarcity of
qualified black teachers.5"
In addition, the fact that throughout the early 1960's, the school
board had policies of placing black faculty members solely in
schools with black majority enrollment, and of refusing to place
qualified black secondary teachers at the secondary level, was not
determinative of segregative intent because "[t]he number of
black teachers so treated was small."59 The board had, in the meantime, made "substantial progress . . .in eradicating the effects of
these policies.'"0
Similarly, the fact that thirty-seven of the thirty-nine new
53. 389 F. Supp. 293 (D. Neb. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 946 (1975), 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded per curiam, 45
U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. June 28, 1977).
54. 389 F. Supp. at 296.
55. Id. at 297.
56. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 321.
58. Id. at 317-18.
59. Id. at 318.

60. Id.
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school buildings constructed between 1951 and 1973 opened predominantly white or predominantly black, which the "School District . . . should be charged with knowing,"'" was not enough to
show segregative intent. While acknowledging the fact that these
schools might have opened with substantially less polarized racial
enrollments, the failure of the school board to take such affirmative
2
action was not evidence of segregative intent. Having failed to find
the intent required by Keyes, the district court dismissed the case.
On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The court stated that "the 'intent' which triggers a finding
of unconstitutionality is not an intent to harm black students, but
'3
simply an intent to bring about or maintain segregated schools."
[A] presumption of segregative intent arises once it is established
that school authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural,
probable and foreseeable consequence of which is to bring about or
maintain segregation. When that presumption arises, the burden
intent' was not
shifts to the defendant to establish that 'segregative
4
among the factors that motivated their actions.
In failing to recognize such a presumption, the district court had
given insufficient effect to its own findings. Evidence in five
decision-making areas65 warranted a finding that the "defendants'
actions and inactions in the face of tendered choices had the natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of creating and maintaining segregation. '"66
As support for the foreseeability test which it applied, the court
noted that the Second and Sixth Circuits had recognized this test
and that the Supreme Court had implied its approval in Milliken
v. Bradley6 7 when it affirmed that part of the district court's decision
which used the foreseeability test. The Supreme Court had said that
"under our decision last Term in Keyes . . . the findings [of dejure
6
segregation] appear to be correct." 1
Having found intentionally segregative action, the court of appeals declared that the constitutional violation had to be eliminated
61. Id. at 319.
62. Id. at 319-20.
63. 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 535-36.
65. Id. at 537. "The five areas include faculty assignment, student transfers, optional
attendance zones, school construction, and the deterioration of Tech High." Id.
66. Id.
67. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
68. 521 F.2d at 536-37 n.10 quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 n.18 (1974).
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root and branch. 9 The case was remanded to the district court for
the formulation of a systemwide remedy. A petition to grant
certiorariwas denied by the Supreme Court. 7°
In Morgan v. Kerrigan," the First Circuit also approved the
foreseeability test and extended the Keyes presumption. In Keyes
the Supreme Court held that intentional discrimination in one
geographicalsection of a school system creates the presumption of
systemwide de jure segregation. Extending that presumption, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals applied Keyes and determined that
a finding of intentional segregation in one administrativearea of the
school system created a presumption of segregative intent elsewhere
in the management of the system.72 As in Omaha, the Supreme
Court refused to review the decision of the court of appeals.7 3
Finally, in 1976, the Fifth Circuit also adopted the foreseeability test, but added the limitation that the segregative effect of
school board action should constitute proof of intent only where the
effect was not only foreseeable but also avoidable."4
In those lower courts which were willing to adopt both the foreseeability test and the Keyes presumption, plaintiffs were consistently successful in obtaining court orders for systemwide remedies.
On the other hand, in those courts which required a subjective standard for proof of segregative intent, no constitutional violation was
found and the cases were dismissed.
Between 1973, when Keyes was decided, and 1976, the Supreme
Court refused, except implicitly in Milliken v. Bradley, to approve
or disapprove the use of the foreseeability test. It was left up to the
lower courts to wrestle with the issue of whether or not a finding of
intent based on foreseeable consequences effectively negated the de
facto/de jure distinction which the Supreme Court had expressly
preserved in Keyes. One commentator posed the problem as follows:
[Tihe interpretation of intent as foreseeability amounts to a proscription of all racial imbalance in public schools. Where any racial
imbalance exists in a school district, the failure to adopt policies that
alleviate the imbalance necessarily maintains and perpetuates the
69. 521 F.2d at 537.
70. 423 U.S. 946 (1975).
71. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
72. 509 F.2d at 594.
73. 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
74. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded per curiam sub nom. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990
(1976).
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imbalance. Such a result is clearly natural and foreseeable. Thus any
school authority that tolerates racially imbalanced schools would be
held to have acted with segregative intent under the foreseeability
test.7"
Nevertheless, a number of district and circuit courts did apply
the test and massive desegregation orders followed, thereby fulfilling the prediction that after Keyes "the possibility of district-wide
busing looms much larger . . . for any board which fosters segrega7
tion even to the slightest degree."
It was not until 1976 that the Supreme Court broke its silence
and made clear its view of the appropriate test for determining
segregative intent. In Washington v. Davis," the Court revealed
that not only did it intend to preserve the de facto/de jure distinction, but also that it favored a subjective standard for proof of
segregative intent. Furthermore, in Village of Arlington Heights v.
75
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court elaborated
on the standard created in Davis and enumerated the factors which
courts should consider in determining whether or not a state agency
has acted with segregative intent. After Davis and Arlington
Heights, plaintiffs could no longer rely on the foreseeability test but
were required to produce evidence of actual intent to segregate as
proof of a constitutional violation.
IV.

DAVIS AND ARLINGTON HEIGHTS: THE NEW LIABILITY STANDARD

In Davis, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, stating that the latter court had erro79
neously applied the legal standards applicable to Title VII cases
rather than equal protection standards to resolve the constitutional
issue presented. In explaining the error, the Court once again affirmed that discriminatory intent is the critical factor in establish75. Comment, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De
Facto/DeJure Distinction,86 YALE L.J. 317, 329 (1976).
76. Schoolhouse Doors, supra note 24, at 151.
77. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
78. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court explained that the
D.C. Court of Appeals had declared that the lack of discriminatory intent was irrelevant when
it applied the statutory standards of Title VII to the due process question. 426 U.S. at 237.
The Court explained that under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion
practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved. It is not enough to demonstrate some rational basis
for the challenged practices. Such personnel practices must be validated in terms of job
performance. The Court refused to adopt "this more rigorous standard for the purpose of
applying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this." Id. at 247-48.
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ing a constitutional violation. Implicitly rejecting the foreseeability
test, the Court declared that "our cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.""0
In reiterating the basic equal protection principle adhered to in
school desegregation cases, the Court cited Keyes' emphasis that
"purpose or intent to segregate" 8 ' is the essential element
of de jure
segregation. While acknowledging that the disproportionate impact
of a law or official action is not "irrelevant," it is "not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution."s'2
Recognizing that language in several earlier decisions had permitted lower courts to conclude that "legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication,"83 the Court limited these cases
and noted that any erroneous impression created by them was overcome by the subsequent decision in Keyes stressing the importance
of intent.84
"Intent" was equated with "state contrivance to segregate" 5
and "a purposeful device to discriminate" 81 implying a subjective
rather than objective standard. By requiring a showing of what
amounts to actual discriminatory intent on the part of school officials, and by making the effect; i.e., disproportionate impact,
merely a relevant factor, the Court clearly indicated that the cause
of racial segregation is the dispositive element and the effect, racial
isolation, only a secondary one.
80. 426 U.S. at 239.
81. Id. at 240, quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
82. 426 U.S. at 242.
83. Id. at 244 n.11. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the Court discussed
the "hazards of declaring a law unconstitutional because of the motivations of its sponsors.
First, it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation or collection of different
motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment." Id. at 224. Acknowledging that
there
was language in a few cases which might suggest that the motive or purpose behind
a law
was relevant to its constitutionality, the Court made clear that the "focus in those cases
was
on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation ....
" Id. at 225.
Similarly, in Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), the Court noted that
the difficulty perceived in Palmer regarding the determination of legislative motivation
was
equally true of school board decisions. "The inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation of
school
authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless." Id. at 462. The Court then declared that
in
evaluating desegregation plans, "we have focused on the effect-not the purpose or motivation-of a school board's action . . . . The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain
an action that has an impermissible effect." Id.
84. 426 U.S. at 243.
85. Id. at 240, quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964).
86. 426 U.S. at 246.
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The burden imposed on plaintiffs to show the kind of intent
required by Davis is not met by proof of foreseeable consequences
or effects. It is not even met by proof that the school authorities are
aware of the disproportionate impact of their acts. Nothing short of
a showing of deliberate, purposeful, systematic discrimination will
justify a finding of a constitutional violation.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens voiced his concern
regarding this apparent implication of the majority decision. He
noted that "[flrequently the most probative evidence of intent will
be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural conse'
quences of his deeds." 87
It is unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged
discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker, or, conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process . . . . [Tihe line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright...
88
as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume.
If there was any doubt as to whether the Davis test for discriminatory intent required proof of actual racial motivation, it was laid
to rest in the Court's subsequent decision in Arlington Heights.
There, the Court reversed the court of appeal's finding that the
ultimate effect of a zoning board decision was racially discriminatory. 9 The Supreme Court determined that the finding was invalid
because the plaintiffs had failed to show that racially discriminatory
0
intent or purpose was a "motivating factor".
The Court cited Davis and attempted to define the proper inquiries for ascertaining discriminatory intent. Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that a challenged action rests "solely on
91
racially discriminatory purposes," or even that a particular purpose was the dominant or primary one. However,92 it is necessary to
show that such purpose was a motivating factor.
It is the rare case indeed in which "a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 253.
Id. at 253-54.
429 U.S. at 254.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
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action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its
face. '9 3 Thus, it is necessary, in most cases, to undertake "a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available."" The Court then proceeded to chart the proper course for such an inquiry and included factors such as: (1) the
historical background of the decision; (2) the specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision; (3) a search for evidence of a departure from the normal procedural sequence; and (4)
the legislative or administrative history particularly where there are
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
minutes of meetings, or reports."
Such an inquiry had to show not only improper motivation, but
that motivation had to be attributable to the decisionmakers. The
fact that opposition to minority groups may have motivated some
opponents of the proposed zoning change did not warrant the conclusion that this motivated the defendants. 6
Upon reviewing the record the Court found, much to the defendants' credit, that there was no evidence of actual racial motivation
in either the official minutes or in the testimony of one zoning board
member. The fact that the district court had forbidden the questioning of other board members about their motivation was not seen
as an abuse of the court's discretion because the plaintiffs had based
their arguments on the wrong theory. Since the plaintiffs had based
their argument on the theory that it was the effect rather than the
motivation of the board's actions that was determinative of a constitutional violation, the fact that they were denied the opportunity to
discover improper motivation was irrelevant."
Justice White, who had delivered the Court's opinion in Davis,
dissented in Arlington Heights. He argued that it was improper to
reverse rather than vacate a lower court's decision in light of a
subsequent Supreme Court holding when the latter was obviously
unavailable at the time the lower court made its decision." He also
criticized the majority opinion for articulating a legal standard nowhere mentioned in Davis." In his opinion, it was "wholly unnecessary for the Court to embark on a lengthy discussion of the standard
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 266.
at
at
at
at

267-68.
269.
270 n.20.
272.
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for proving the racially discriminatory purpose required by Davis for
a Fourteenth Amendment violation." 00
In embarking on this lengthy discussion, the Court appears to
have departed from its custom of deciding constitutional questions
on the narrowest possible grounds. In the process, it defined an even
more explicitly subjective test than Davis, particularly by reference
to board minutes and statements as indicia of intent. Since Justice
Stevens did not participate in this decision, it may only be assumed
that he would have been as concerned by the implications of this
decision as he was by the subjective nature of the Davis test.
Thus, Davis and Arlington Heights imposed on plaintiffs a far
more demanding evidentiary standard for proving a constitutional
violation than had been applied in the southern cases or in Keyes.
"There was no need in the southern desegregation cases to probe
into segregative intent and proximate cause with respect to a multiplicity of factors."'' The existence of a discriminatory statute was
all that was necessary to justify a finding of dejure segregation. And
while Keyes did require proof of segregative intent, it was sufficient
to show that school board action was taken with the knowledge that
it was substantially certain to have segregative consequences. 12
This standard differed from the foreseeability test only in that
it required that the segregative effect be substantially certain rather
than merely natural or probable. The difference between the Davis
and Keyes standards is analagous to the difference in degree of
criminal culpability found in the Model Penal Code. 0 3 Davis requires the equivalent of purposeful action; i.e., that a school board
have racial discrimination as its "conscious object".0 4 Keyes merely
requires that a school board know that its actions are "practically
certain"'' 0 to result in discrimination. Clearly, the former burden is
the heavier one.
In December, 1976, the Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, remanded in one sentence Austin Independent School District v. United States'6 for reconsideration in light of Davis. Only
the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, indicated the Court's rationale. It
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 273.
413 U.S. 189, 235 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
303 F. Supp. at 286.

103.

ALI MODEL

104.
105.
106.

Id. at § 2.02 (2)(a)(i).
Id. at § 2.02 (2)(b)(ii).
429 U.S. 990 (1976).
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was suggested that the remand was prompted by the court of appeals' use of the foreseeability test. "The Court of Appeals may have
erred by a readiness to impute to school officials a segregative intent
far more pervasive than the evidence justified."'' 7 Although it did
not have the force of a full opinion, Austin did provide a clue as to
how the Court would apply the Davis standard to a school desegregation case. More importantly, it also suggested that the Court was
preparing to adopt a more restrictive approach to the issue of remedy.108 Both of these issues were dealt with in a more thorough
manner in the Supreme Court's decision in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,09 decided on June 27, 1977.
V.

THE DAYTON CASE IN THE LOWER COURTS

As the most recent statement of the legal standards to be applied in northern desegregation cases, the Dayton decision merits
careful analysis. On the issue of segregative intent or liability, it is
significant to the extent that it shows the way in which Davis and
Arlington Heights are applicable to a school desegregation case." 0
However, its primary significance is that it defines, in the most
precise language to date, the method by which remedies for racially
discriminatory school board action are to be designed.
As will become clear, the remedy equation constructed by the
Court is far more restrictive than the general standard that the
"nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy,""
which was defined in Swann and subsequently applied in Keyes.
Armed with the Keyes presumption of systemwide impact triggered
107. Id. at 991. The opinion noted that the court of appeals had deemed the use of
neighborhood schools rather than proof of segregative intent as the controlling element.
According to the court of appeals: "A segregated school system is the foreseeable and inevitable result of such an assignment policy. When this policy is used, we may infer that the
school authorities acted with segregative intent." Id. at 992 n.1, quoting Petitioner's Brief
for Certiorari at 20.
108. Justice Powell declared: "I do not suggest that transportation of pupils is never a
permissible means of implementing desegregation." 429 U.S. at 994-95. However, "large-scale
busing is permissible only where the evidence supports a finding that the extent of integration
sought to be achieved by busing would have existed had the school authorities fulfilled their
constitutional obligations in the past." Id. at 995. Application of this standard "would rarely
result in the widespread busing of elementary-age children." Id.
109. 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977).
110. Priorto Dayton, the Court remanded the Indianapolis desegregation case for reconsideration in light of Davis. However, the remand was not in the form of a full opinion.
Buckley v. Board of School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975), 541 F.2d 1211 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom. Board of School Commissioners v.
Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
111. 402 U.S. at 16.
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by a finding of localized de jure segregation, the nature of the violation was likely to be quite broad, thus requiring an extensive remedy, including massive busing orders, to eliminate all the vestiges
of prior discriminatory acts." 2
The Dayton equation, on the other hand, may result in more
limited remedies. In the future, it is likely that the effects of intentional discriminatory acts will be carefully pruned rather than eliminated root and branch.
. The original complaint was filed on April 17, 1972 as a class
action by the parents of children attending the Dayton schools. The
complaint sought, inter alia, to enjoin the Dayton School Board
from continuing their allegedly unconstitutional policy of operating
the public schools in a manner that perpetuated racial segregation."13 In addition to the parents, the NAACP joined as party plaintiff.
After an expedited hearing, the district court filed its findings
of fact and memorandum of law on February 7, 1973. The court
divided its discussion regarding the findings of fact into two sections-a historical perspective of the Dayton schools, and the school
system as it was at the time of trial. The court began by noting that
evidence had established "isolated but repeated instances of failure
by the Dayton School Board to meet the standards of the Ohio law
mandating an integrated school system.""' However, because of a
substantial time lapse and the fact that these practices had ceased,
"the foregoing will not necessarily be deemed evidence of continuing
5
segregative policy."1
A second area of inquiry was that of the hiring and placement
of teachers. The policy of assigning black teachers only to black
112. In Keyes, the Court expressly criticized both lower courts for their unduly restrictive approach to proof of intent evidenced by the lower court's unwillingness to infer a broader
discriminatory purpose from a finding of segregative intent in the Park Hills schools. 413 U.S.
at 200.
113. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684, 685-86 (6th Cir. 1974).
114. Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. 72-137 slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ohio filed Feb. 8, 1973)
(hereinafter cited as Brinkman A.). OHIO REv. CODE § 3313.48 was upheld by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Board of Educ. v. State, 45 Ohio St. 555 (1888), which prohibited separate
schools for blacks and whites and required school regulations to apply to all children, irrespective of race or color. Brinkman A at 2.
The isolated instances of Dayton's failure to meet these standards included the physical
segregation into separate buildings of pupils and teachers by race at the Garfield school in
the early 1920's, a denial to blacks of access to swimming pools in high schools in the 1930's
and 1940's and the exclusion, between 1938 and 1948, of black high school teams from the
city athletic conference. The court noted that these practices were discontinued before Brown.
Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 3.
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schools was discontinued in the 1951-1952 school year. Moreover, by
1971, subsequent to an order from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to desegregate the teaching staff, the board
began to assign faculty "in such a manner that the ratio between
black and white teachers in each school substantially reflected the
ratio between black and white teachers in the system as a whole."'' 8
Thus the former segregative practice had been abandoned and the
faculty had become substantially integrated.
The court also found that in 1933, when the Paul Laurence
Dunbar High School was established, it was "intended to be, and
did in fact become, a black high school, with an all black teacher
and pupil population."" 7 At that time there were no school attendance zones, however, and attendance at Dunbar was voluntary. Of
course, when attendance zones were established, Dunbar continued
to exist as a city-wide all-black high school until it closed in 1962.111
Turning to the school system as it was at the time of trial, the
court observed that "the great majority""' 9 of all of the Dayton
schools were racially imbalanced. However, the court found no constitutional violations in the area of attendance zones. For example,
the court stated that the attendance boundaries established for
middle schools in September, 1971 had neither segregative nor integrative effect. 2 0 The fact that three of the five schools were over
ninety percent one-race schools was not deemed segregative. 2 ' Nor
did the court find that sufficient evidence had been presented "that
elementary school construction was segregative in nature other than
to provide schools in white neighborhoods which remain predominantly white and schools in black neighborhoods which remain predominantly black."'' 22 The plaintiffs had failed to sustain the burden
of showing that the school board had not used neutral criteria.
On the other hand, the court did find that the use of optional
attendance zones, which allowed children residing in certain areas
a choice among two or more schools, might have had adverse racial
effects and that two such zones still had potential effects in terms
of increased racial separation.' i The court found that voluntary
transfers under the board's freedom of enrollment policy had never
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 15 (Appendix A).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
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exceeded 1.5 percent of the total student enrollment and thus had
made only slight improvement in racial balance, although it had
been fairly operated.
Finally, the court found that the rescission by a newly elected
school board of resolutions passed by the previous board constituted
''an independent violation of the Equal Protection Clause rights
enjoyed by the black minority of Dayton."'' 4 The resolutions had
"recognized the existence of racial segregation in the Dayton
schools, the role played by the Board . . . and the concomitant
responsibility of the Board to eradicate these patterns through af' 25
firmative action.'
In its memorandum of law, the court declared: "What we have
found are racially imbalanced schools, optional attendance zones,
and recent Board action, which are cumulatively in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. We hold that the totality of these findings
require intervention by this Court under the mandate of Brown v.
' 26
Board of Education.'
In suggesting remedial guidelines, the court declared: "Without
seeking to calibrate the degree of segregation that inheres in individual policies of the Board, we hold that these must be refashioned in
such manner as to avoid future racially disharmonious potential."'
The court then proceeded to order four specific remedies to avoid
such potential. The board was to abolish all optional attendance
zones, restate the priorities of the freedom of enrollment policy,
maintain the board's faculty assignment policy and establish hiring
policies to insure a ratio of black clerical and maintenance personnel
commensurate with the black-white ratio of the school district.'2
The court termed these minimum requirements for board consideration.
In compliance with this order, the school board submitted a
plan which included these four specific requirements. While expressing disappointment at the limited nature of the remainder of
the plan, 29 the court accepted it. Its guiding principle in doing so
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 13.
127. Id.
128. Id.at 13-14.
129. Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. 72-137 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 13, 1973) (Supplemental
Order on Remedy). Points V through XI of the plan included: V.) the establishment of
integrated science centers to which elementary children would be bused for part of the school
day; VI.) the combination of the two existing vocational schools into a unified cooperative
school with a district-wide attendance area; VII.) the Musical Stereopticon, an all-city ele-
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was a paraphrase from Swann. "It is the function of the federal
courts only to eliminate a deprivation of constitutional rights; it is
the duty of local school boards to operate and maintain integrated
school systems."' 30 Thus the court appeared to view Swann as proscribing segregation but not prescribing integration.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. On
August 20, 1974, that court rendered its opinion which affirmed the
findings of fact but remanded for the formulation by the district
court of a broader remedy. In affirming the fact findings, the court
found them amply supported by the evidence. The record supported
the finding of racial imbalance by showing that in 1951-52, thirtyeight of the forty-seven schools in the system had student enrollments ninety percent or more one race; in 1963-64, fifty-seven of
sixty-four schools were ninety percent or more one-race, and in
1971-72, forty-nine of the sixty-nine schools had student enrollments of ninety percent or more one-race. The court concluded:
Every school which was 90 per cent or more black in 1951-52 or 196364 or 1971-72 and which is still in use today remains 90. per cent or
more black. Of the 25 white schools in 1972-73, all opened 90 per cent
or more white and, if open, were 90 per cent or more white in 197172, 1963-64 and 1951-52.' 3'
mentary and high school band and chorus; VIII.) the requirement that athletics be integrated
and that schools whose teams had no minority members play other schools with minority
representation on their teams; IX.) the requirement that all classroom teachers study linguistic differences existing in American English, in a series of in-service workshops; X.) the
creation of a Living Arts Center with departments in art, creative writing, dance, and drama;
and, XI.) the establishment of rumor control, school guidance, and area learning centers.
Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1974). While this plan was under consideration by the court, the plaintiffs filed objections on the grounds that it froze-in the existing
system of segregation. Id.
130. Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. 72-137 (S.D. Ohio filed July 13, 1973) (Supplemental
Order on Remedy). The court noted the Keyes decision which it had studied prior to issuing
the supplemental order. Id. The court announced that it proposed to follow the rationale of
the concurring opinion of Justice Powell and directed the board of education "to comply to
the fullest extent possible with the views stated therein." Id. Adopting as its guiding definition the statement made by Justice Powell that an integrated system did not mean that every
school must be integrated as long as the system itself was genuinely integrated, the court
continued:
The Powell rationale will operate prospectively. The Board's planning and implementation units must become capable of and sensitive to the racial effects which flow from
the drawing of attendance lines, the construction and improvement of school facilities
and the assignment of faculty, staff and pupils. All of such actions must henceforth
be examined for their 'integrative impact'. Id.
131. 503 F.2d at 695.
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The court also affirmed the finding of the "deleterious effect
that the optional attendance zones had on integration in Dayton."''
Since these first two findings were elements of the cumulative violation, the school board had acted "in a manner consistent with its
constitutional duties' '3 3 when it passed the resolutions. The court
explained that if the board were under such a duty, then the rescission would become a part of the cumulative violation and it would
not be necessary to determine, as the district court had, that the
rescission was an independent violation. The court concluded that
it was a part of the cumulative violation thereby indicating its belief
that the board did have a constitutional duty to pass the resolutions. '31
After affirming the district court's cumulative finding, the
court of appeals proceeded to discuss at length the other alleged
violations which the appellants argued should have been included
in the original fact findings. Reviewing evidence in the record regarding staff assignments, school construction, grade structure and
reorganization, transfers and transportation, the court acknowledged that appellants had raised "serious questions with respect to
whether the District Judge's failure to include these four school
practices within the cumulative violation was supported by substantial evidence.' ' 3 5 However, the court found it unnecessary to
resolve these questions because the remedy accepted by the district
court was inadequate even as it related to the limited fact findings.
The court remanded the case for proceedings to formulate a desegregation plan "consistent with the remedial guidelines outlined in
Keyes . . . and Swann . . . '[A]ll vestiges of state-imposed seg36
regation' . . . must be eliminated.'
Once the plaintiff-appellants have shown that state-imposed segregation existed at the time of Brown (or any point thereafter), school
authorities 'automatically assume an affirmative duty . . . to eliminate from the public school system all vestiges of state-imposed
school segregation'. Keyes . ... When such a showing has been
made, 'racially neutral' plans which fail to counteract the continuing
effects of past school segregation are inadequate. 3 '
On remand, the district court ordered the school board to sub132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 696.
at 697.
at 703.
at 704.
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mit a plan consistent with the decision of the court of appeals. On
March 12, 1975, the court accepted, with minor modifications, the
board's revised plan"" which it found to be "desegregative in in39
tent".1
Following the district court's order, the plaintiffs once again
appealed. The court of appeals found that the newly adopted plan
did not conform to the mandate of the order of remand. 40 Acknowledging that the approved plan contained some provisions which
apparently might effect some improvements in the segregated conditions, "[tihe Constitution, . . . recent decisions of the Supreme
Court, . . . and . . . the previous mandate required more."'' The
plan failed to eliminate the continuing effects of past segregation
and the basic pattern of one-race schools would continue largely
unabated. The court ordered the adoption of a systemwide plan that
would conform to the previous mandate and the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Keyes and Swann. The plan was to be implemented in September, 1976.112
Following the second remand, the district court reached "the
reluctant conclusion that there exists no feasible method of complying with the mandate' 4 3 without the transportation of a substantial
138. Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. 72-137 (S.D. Ohio, filed Mar. 10, 1975) (hereinafter
cited as Brinkman B). The new plan included: 1) a proposal to close Roosevelt High School
which had 100 percent black enrollment and permit its students to attend any high school of
their choice; 2) a downtown magnet high school with special programs which could accomodate 300 students at any one time, and satellite magnet programs which could serve 375
students at any one time, but no students would attend on a full-time basis; 3) part-time
magnet learning centers in foreign language, career motivation and business education for
elementary students; 4) expansion of the science centers to accomodate more students, none
of whom would spend more than 10 percent of their total instruction time at the centers; 5)
a new racially balanced vocational high school; 6) the restructuring of an all-black elementary
school into an alternative elementary school with enrollment optional and full-time, and the
possible reassignment of the present students who are not admitted to the restructured
school, to two other all-black schools; 7) the creation of a magnet alternative intermediary
school to discourage drop-outs; and, 8) the continuation of the existing freedom of enrollment
programs. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 518 F.2d 853, 854-55 (6th Cir. 1975). The court rejected an
alternative plan submitted by the plaintiffs which proposed the assignment of students in a
black/white ratio approximating, plus or minus 15 percent, the racial composition of the
student population. The court stated that neither Swann nor Milliken required racial balance
which, according to the court, was the sole function of the plaintiffs' plan. Brinkman B at 68.
139. Id. at 9. The court acknowledged the fact that it was entirely possible that the
proposed plan would not attract an appropriate number of black and white students and
might instead further segregate the school system, however, the plan deserved a "fair trial."
Id. at 10.
140. 518 F.2d 853, 854 (6th Cir. 1975).
141. Id. at 855.
142. Id. at 857.
143. Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. C-3-75-304 slip op. at 2. (S.D. Ohio, filed Dec. 29, 1975)
(hereinafter cited as Brinkman C).
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number of students. Consequently, the court ordered that "as of
September 1, 1976, each and every school in the Dayton School
District will have a pupil population approaching the district percentage, but deviating no more than 15% plus or minus""' from the
black/white ratio of students. A master was appointed to supervise
the design of the plan and a board composed of representative citizens was created to monitor the plan once it was put into effect.4 5
On March 25, 1976 the court adopted the plan filed by the master,'
with some modifications designed to give the school board greater
flexibility.
The school board appealed the district court's order arguing
that the remedy ordered exceeded the scope of the violations and
that the fixed percentage formula adopted to achieve racial balance
was contrary to Swann.'4 ' The court of appeals countered by pointing out the flexibility of the ratio requirement which would permit
a range between 33 percent and 63 percent black enrollment in any
particular school. Citing Swann, the court concluded that the use
of mathematical ratios was "no more than 'a useful starting point'
in shaping a remedy for past discrimination."'"1
The court also rejected the argument that the plan implicitly
required periodic adjustments to maintain the required racial mix
in violation of Pasadenav. Spangler.'" If adjustments were sought
144. Id. at 5. In achieving this redistribution, the court urged that wherever possible
students should be permitted to attend walk-in schools in neighborhoods which already had
the approved ratio; that students be transported to the nearest available school; and that no
student be transported for a period of time exceeding twenty minutes or two miles, whichever
was shorter. Id. at 6-7.
The court concluded that the proposed plan would result in a desegregated system as
contemplated in Keyes and Swann. Id. at 8..
145. Id. at 7-8.
146. The plan proposed to desegregate the elementary schools by a combination of
redefining attendance areas and the pairing of schools, and to desegregate the high schools
by altering attendance zones. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 539 F.2d 1084, 1085 (6th Cir. 1976).
147. 539 F.2d at 1086. The appellants argued that Swann does not require that every
school in every community always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a
whole.
148. Id. quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 25. The court also noted other circuit courts which
had approved similar desegregation plans requiring systemwide adherence, within an established percentage range, to the student racial composition of the district. Morgan v. Kerrigan,
530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1976); Harrington v. Colquitt Bd. of
Educ., 460 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1972); United States v.
Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S.946 (1975); Kelly v. Guinn, 456
F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521
F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
149. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In Spangler, Justice Rehnquist stated that once the school
district has in fact complied with a desegregation order, the district court is not entitled to
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in future years, the district court would at that time have to
"consider the limitations of Spangler.""'° The order of the district
court was affirmed and the plan was implemented in September,
1976. Meanwhile, however, the school board filed a petition for
certiorari,which the Supreme Court granted on January 17, 1977.'1'
VI.

THE DAYTON DECISION:

A NEW

REMEDY STANDARD

On June 27, 1977, the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Dayton. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by
noting the fact that the case arrived at the Supreme Court "after
five years and two round trips through the lower federal courts."',"
The Court reviewed the original findings of fact of the district
court both as to those areas in which no violations had been found
and to the three components of the cumulative violation. Noting
that the phrase "cumulative violation" was ambiguous, the Court
stated that when viewed most favorably to respondents, the most
that could be said was that "there were three separate although
relatively isolated instances of unconstitutional action on the part
of petitioners."' 53
The Court then observed that treated most favorably to petitioners, the cumulative violation "must be viewed in quite a different light."' 5
Citing Davis, the Court declared that a finding that the pupil
population "is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing that
this condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions on the
part of the Board.""'5 .
Next, the Court found that the optional attendance zones had
only had segregative effect on the high school level.' Finally, the
district court's determination that the board's rescission of the resolutions was itself a constitutional violation was "also of questionable
require the school district to rearrange its attendance zones each year to ensure that the
desired racial mix is maintained in perpetuity.
150. 539 F.2d at 1087.
151. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 429 U.S. 1060 (1977).
152. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766, 2769 (1977).
153. Id. at 2772. While it is possible to view the use of optional attendance zones and
the rescission of the resolutions as "relatively isolated instances of unconstitutional action,"
it is rather unusual terminology to designate the district court's finding of substantial imbalance an isolated instance of school board action.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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validity."'5 7 The Court distinguished Reitman v. Mulkey, 5 8 in which
a rejection of integrative measures had been found to be a constitutional violation, by stating that the Dayton repudiation did not
"undo operative regulations affecting the assignment of pupils...
but simply repudiated a resolution of a predecessor Board stating
that it recognized its own fault in not taking affirmative action at
an earlier date."' 159 The Court ignored language in the resolutions in
which the board had recognized not only its own fault but that of
"this and predecessor boards"'' 0 to take affirmative action. More
importantly, the Court ignored the fact that Reitman v. Mulkey had
been cited in Keyes as support for the proposition that rescission of
integrative school board resolutions establishes a constitutional violation. And in Keyes, as in Dayton, the resolutions had not been
implemented at the time they were rescinded. 6 '
Having raised questions as to the validity of the district court's
limited fact findings, the Court declared that they did not "suffice
to justify the remedy imposed.' '1 2 While sympathetic to the difficulties inherent in determining "the motivations of multimembered
public bodies,' 6 3 the Court stated that the original plan adopted by
the district court was "certainly not based on an unduly cautious
understanding of its authority." 4 The court of appeals "simply had
no warrant in our cases for imposing the systemwide remedy which
it apparently did."' 65 Instead of tailoring a remedy commensurate
to the three specific violations, the court of appeals had expressed
its vague dissatisfaction with the district court's plan and instituted
4'a
far more sweeping one of its own, without in any way upsetting
157. Id.
158. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
159. 97 S. Ct. at 2772.
160. Brinkman A at 18 (Appendix D).
161. 303 F. Supp. at 285. Two other cases also found such rescissions unconstitutional.
In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973), the district court
described the passage of resolutions to desegregate the school system which were passed in
April and May, 1971. Following a school board election early in July, the newly elected board
rescinded the resolutions. The court concluded that the rescission "was itself an act of dejure
segregation." 368 F. Supp. at 198. Not only would the rescission alone have necessitated a
judgment for plaintiffs, but this unconstitutional act also "compounded defendants' many
other constitutionally impermissible actions ....
" Id.
Similarly, in Martin v. Evansville Vanderburgh School Corp., 347 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.
Ind. 1972), a rescission of a desegregation plan was held unconstitutional.
162. 97 S. Ct. at 2772.
163. Id.
164. Id. At 2773.
165. Id. at 2774.

Published by eCommons, 1978

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

the . . . findings of fact or reversing the conclusions of law."'' 6 The
court acknowledged that the record might justify additional findings of fact, but the court of appeals had failed to do so; and the
respondents had failed to cross-petition for certiorarion the grounds
that the court of appeals had erred in refusing to resolve this serious
question.
Had the failure of the court of appeals to rule on the respondents' assignments of error been the only deficiency in the record,
the Court might have remanded to that court. But, "we think it
evident that supplementation of the record will be necessary.''17
Therefore, the Court remanded the case to the district court "for the
making of more specific findings and, if necessary, the taking of
additional evidence," in view of the "confusion at various stages in
this case . . . as to the applicable principles and appropriate relief." 8'
The Court then proceeded to define precisely what the district
court was to do on remand. After making new findings and conclusions as to violations "in light of this opinion, Washington v. Davis
. . . and Village of Arlington Heights, . . . it must then fashion a
remedy in the light of the rule laid down in Swann, Hills. . . [and]
Austin ..
."I" Once a constitutional violation is found, a court is
required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature of the
violation. In elaborating on this task, the Court defined the standard to be applied as follows:
The duty of both the District Court and of the Court of Appeals in a
case such as this, where mandatory segregation by law . . . has long
since ceased, is to first determine whether there was any action in the
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2775.
168. Id.
169. Id.; Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). This case was a class action against
the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), alleging that CHA had deliberately avoided placing black families in white
neighborhoods and HUD had assisted in that policy by providing financial assistance and
other support. The district court rejected a motion for metropolitan relief. The court of
appeals reversed and ordered further consideration of metropolitan relief. The Supreme Court
distinguished Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) and held that a metropolitan area
remedy in this case was not impermissible as a matter of law. 425 U.S. at 305.
In discussing the proper scope of a remedy, the Court stated that in the event of a
constitutional violation, all reasonable methods should be available to formulate an effective
remedy and that every effort should be made to employ those methods which achieve the
greatest possible degree of relief. The Court concluded by quoting Swann's broad definition
of equitable powers to remedy past wrongs, "for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies." Id. at 297.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss1/7

COMMENT

1978]

conduct of the business of the school board which was intended to,
and did in fact, discriminate against minority pupils, teachers or
staff. Washington v. Davis . . . If such violations are found, the
District Court . . . must determine how much incremental segrega-

tive effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such
constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress
that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may

there be a systemwide remedy. Keyes ....

17

The Court concluded by noting that the plan had been in effect
during the year without creating serious problems and that, therefore, it should remain in effect "for the coming school year subject
to such further orders of the District Court as it may find warranted
following the hearings mandated by this opinion.""'' The majority
opinion concluded by vacating the judgment of the court of appeals
and remanding to the district court.
As he had in Davis, Justice Stevens concurred with the majority opinion but once again noted that "the relevant finding of intent
in a case of this kind necessarily depends primarily on objective
evidence concerning the effect of the Board's action, rather than the
subjective motivation of one or more members of the Board
"172

Justice Brennan also concurred, acknowledging that the three
violations found by the district court, while not sufficient to justify
the remedy imposed when considered solely as unconstitutional
actions, "clearly are very significant as indicia of intent on the part
of the school board."'7 Justice Brennan referred to the Keyes discussion of the probative value of a finding of intentional segregation
as to a portion of a school system, in assessing the school board's
intent with respect to other part of the system. Thus he appeared
to believe that the Keyes presumption could be adapted to administrative rather than geographic areas of a school system. Moreover,
he noted that once segregative intent was established, the district
court could "more readily conclude that not only the blatant, but
also subtle actions-

.

. .

even inaction-justify a finding of uncon-

stitutional segregation that must be redressed by a remedial busing
170.
171.
172.
173.

97 S. Ct. at 2775 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2776.
Id.
Id. at 2777.
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order such as that imposed in this case."'' l He concluded by urging
the district court to be "mindful not only of its 'authority to grant
appropriate relief, . . . , but also of its duty to remedy fully those
17 5
constitutional violations it finds.'
VII.

ANALYSIS: DAYTON AND BEYOND

Reaction to the Court's decision in Dayton has been varied. To
some it appears simply to be a reaffirmation of the legal standards
propounded by earlier decisions. 17 To others, it appears to create a
new standard for desegregration remedies which goes far beyond the
general guidelines of Swann and Keyes and insures that orders
which require massive busing will exceed the proper scope of a con177
stitutional remedy when measured against this standard.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. This is the view shared by Justice Brennan as evidenced by his dissent in the
remand of Omaha for reconsideration in light of Dayton, two days after the latter decision.
45 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. June 28, 1977) (per curiam). See note 193 supra.
The Court's earlier decision to review the Dayton case had caused consternation among
desegregation experts. "Their worst fear is that the high court will proceed in its pattern of
taking a hard look at lower court handling of school cases and restrict the amount of desegregation, as well as put more burdens on blacks in the legal battle against segregated schools."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1977, § C, at 22, col. 2. Nathaniel Jones, general counsel for the NAACP
told the reporter that he did not believe the Court would scrap the Dayton plan, but he noted
that the Court had "come full circle in the intent versus effect of past policies." Id. at col. 4.
Following the Dayton decision, Mr. Jones stated his view that it represented "a reaffirmation of the traditional standards." Dayton Daily News, June 28, 1977, at 4, col. 4. Other
experts shared this view. A Justice Department official who had helped write his agency's
brief, asking the Court to uphold the systemwide busing plan, stated that the decision did
not make "any new law in the school desegregation field. The opinion sticks closely to the
prior decisions in the field." Id. at cols. 1-2.
In addition, William Taylor, director of the Center for National Policy Review, a public
interest civil rights organization, said that the decision "dashed the hopes of those who
thought it would undo the previous requirements." Id. at cols. 3-4.
Another writer termed the decision "appropriately unextraordinary. It reaffirmed the
authority . . . to order systemwide busing, and reiterated the Court's developing philosophy
that such remedies should be ordered only when justified by conscious government policy
rather than mere historic patterns of segregation." Miller, Conflicting Signals: The Supreme
Court Tells Dayton's Buses to Shift into Reverse, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 1977, at 10.
177. This view is reflected in the remands made in per curiam decisions two days after
the Dayton decision. 45 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. June 28, 1977). See note 191 infra and accompanying discussion.
The reaction of school officials and their counsel in other Ohio cities was that the Dayton
decision "could have significant impact on similar cases in those cities." Dayton Daily News,
June 28, 1977, at 4, col. 3. For example, the attorney for the Cleveland Board of Education
said: "It is a most significant decision. It will have an effect on every northern school district
in the United States." Id. The decision was viewed as crucial to both the Cleveland and
Columbus cases because the remedial plans for those cities were based on the Dayton plan,
following the guidelines established by the Sixth Circuit. Id. at col. 4.
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Viewed in its simplest terms, the Dayton decision does, indeed,
appear merely to reaffirm earlier decisions. This explains why the
decision was a unanimous one. 7 8 The Supreme Court was presented
with a clear example of a remedy which ignored the Swann directive
that a remedy must be tailored to the nature of the violation. The
district court had adopted a restrictive approach. As a result, its
findings were quite limited because it required a higher evidentiary
standard for segregative intent than the failure to exercise options
to promote integration.'79 Nor did the district court adopt a foreseeability test which would have found intent based on the natural and
probable segregative consequences of school board action or inaction. Nor did the court avail itself of the powerful weapon of the
Keyes presumption and infer systemwide impact from its limited
findings.
The remedy required by the district court was also narrowly
defined. The first plan adopted was entirely prospective in nature, 80
i.e., it required that past segregative acts be terminated but it did
not deal with the issue of eliminating the effects of past segregative
The view of this comment is that the Dayton decision and the remedy standard enunciated by it do represent a shift by the Court from earlier decisions. However, that is not to
suggest that cities currently under desegregation orders will not have to comply with them.
For example, on October 3, 1977, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the inter-district
desegregation plan in Wilmington, Delaware. Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Del.
1974), modified, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd 423 U.S. 1080 (1975), 416 F. Supp.
328 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Delaware Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 46 U.S.L.W.
3206 (U.S. October 4, 1977).
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist voted to set aside the lower
court's order and remand for determination as to whether the lower court had gone too far.
Justices Stevens and Marshall did not participate in the decision. The remaining four justices
refused to review the order. Dayton Daily News, Oct. 4, 1977, at 21, col. 1. Had four justices
been willing to review the case, it is presumed that the Dayton standard would be applied,
and the plan, which requires ten predominantly white suburban school districts to merge with
the predominately black Wilmington district, would be found excessive.
178. Justices Stevens and Brennan filed concurring opinions. Justice Marshall did not
participate in the decision.
179. Of the court's cumulative finding, only one of the three components was based on
a subjective definition of intent; that is, the rescission of resolutions. The optional attendance
zones were found to be a violation because they might have had "adverse racial effects."
Brinkman A at 8. The finding that a great majority of the schools were racially imbalanced
was an objective fact accompanied by the finding that it had not resulted from manipulation
of attendance zones. Id. at 6. There was no mention of a finding based on contemporary
statements-by members of the decision-making body, which Arlington Heights later suggested as an appropriate subject of inquiry. Thus the court did not include in its findings
statements which indicated the motives of school board members; such as the statement of
the Dayton School Board president, that he was "100 percent for integration and 100 percent
opposed to desegregation." The Journal Herald, Dec. 3, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
180. See note 129, supra and accompanying text for components of plan.
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policies. If it was appropriate to find "racially imbalanced
schools"'"' a component of the cumulative violation, then it is difficult to discern how the original plan could be viewed as eliminating
the vestiges of this violation. As the plaintiffs noted in their first
appeal, the plan would have little effect on the status quo.' 2
Therefore, it is arguable that the court of appeals was correct
in deeming the proposed remedy inadequate. However, the court of
appeals clearly erred when it ordered a systemwide remedy based
on the original findings of fact. According to the requirements of
Keyes, the court of appeals left out several critical steps between the
initial findings of a constitutional violation and the order for a systemwide remedy.'83 Keyes provides a tool to facilitate the progression from an initial localized finding of segregative intent to a finding of systemwide de jure segregation but it does not eliminate the
requirement that a systemwide violation be found. According to
Keyes, before a systemwide remedy can be ordered, it is necessary
to show that the school system is a dual one. Only then does the
school board assume an affirmative duty to desegregate the entire
system. In its opinion after the first remand, the district court
clearly stated that it had not found that Dayton was a dual system. ,84 While the court of appeals had the opportunity to resolve the
''serious questions" regarding whether or not the record justified
additional findings of intentional segregation, it declined to do so.
Without such additional findings and a determination that, as a
result of these findings, the Dayton school system was, in fact, a
dual system, the court of appeals was not justified in ordering a
systemwide remedy.
The decision required of the Supreme Court was unusually
181. Brinkman A at 13.
182. 503 F.2d at 687. Several elements of the plan simply acknowledged existing integrative practices of the school system, rather than promoting further integration. As noted
above, the school faculty had been ordered by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to integrate in a manner reflecting the black/white ratio of Dayton's population in
1969. The Living Arts Center was created in the 1960's with federal funds. The school board
which rescinded the integrative resolutions had campaigned prior to the election to eliminate
this educational "frill." At the time the conservative candidates were urging its elimination,
the Living Arts Center was the only voluntary city-wide program with substantial integrative
effect.
Several other components of the plan were strictly part-time or extra-curricular, for
example, the science centers, the all-city band, the integrated athletic program and the
minority language program.
183. See text accompanying note 137, supra, for the court of appeals' interpretation of
Keyes.
184. Brinkman B at 3.
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clear cut and could have been reached merely by reference to the
standards enunciated in Swann and Keyes. However, as it had in
Arlington Heights, the Court seized the opportunity presented to it
on appeal, and went beyond what a decision on the narrowest constitutional grounds would have required. Just as Arlington Heights
constituted more than a reaffirmation of Washington v. Davis and
created new law, so Dayton constituted more than a reaffirmation
of Swann and Keyes and, effectively, created a new remedial standard which is by far the most rigorous to date.
The equation defined by the Court requires that a proper remedy be designed by redressing the difference (R) between the degree
of segregation which currently exists in a school system (S I) and
that degree which would have existed but for the unconstitutional
acts of the school board (S2 ). In mathematical terms, the equation
would be: S'-S=R.
The Supreme Court has imposed on the courts the task of
applying a test which is comparable to that of proximate cause in
negligence theory, in which the actor is liable for the consequences
which but for his action would not have come about. It is noteworthy, however, that the Court was unwilling to borrow the test for
intent from negligence theory; i.e., foreseeability. That the Court
continues to apply a subjective test is evident not only from its order
on remand to find liability in light of Davis, but also from its reference to the difficult task of determining "the motivations of multimembered public bodies."' 5
One need only attempt to apply the Dayton equation to previous Supreme Court decisions to conclude that it is a new standard.
As Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in Keyes, "the
remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond the elimination of
the outgrowths of the state-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown
... "I" Indeed, "[i]n imposing on metropolitan southern school
districts an affirmative duty, entailing large-scale transportation of
pupils, . . . the Court required these districts to alleviate conditions
which in large part did not result from historic, state imposed de
jure segregation."' 87
Similarly, the systemwide remedies imposed in Denver, Boston, Louisville, Indianapolis and other northern cities, which had
racial balance as their objective also resulted in greater integration
185.
186.
187.

97 S. Ct. at 2772.
413 U.S. at 223.
Id. at 222.
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than typical residential patterns in urban settings would have produced. Noting this discrepancy in Keyes, Justice Powell commented:
The Denver School Board, by its action and non action, may be
legally responsible for some of the segregation that exists. But if one
assumes a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the Denver
Board over past decades, the fundamental problem of residential
segregation would persist. It is, indeed, a novel application of equitable power-not to mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine-to require so much greater a degree of forced school integration
than would have resulted from purely natural and neutral nonstate
causes.'
Despite Justice Powell's observations in Keyes, courts continued to decree systemwide desegregation, once a systemwide violation had been found, using as their guide the general requirement
of Swann to eliminate all the vestiges of state-imposed segregation
and of Green to desegregate the entire system root and branch.
Typically, the district court in its first opinion in Dayton felt
no obligation to "callibrate the degree of segregation that inheres in
individual policies of the Board ... ."I9 Nor has this writer discovered any school desegregation decision in which a court felt constitutionally compelled to do so. As a result of the new standard created
in Dayton, however, courts will be required to do so in the future.
Two days after the Dayton decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded two desegregation decisions,
thereby giving an immediate indication of its impact on future decisions. As noted earlier, in Omaha'""the Supreme Court had denied
certiorarifollowing the court of appeal's remand to the district court
for a systemwide remedy. Now it granted the petition in view of the
fact that the remedy involved the systemwide transportation of
pupils. The Court remanded for reconsideration of the finding of
liability in light of Davis and Arlington Heights.'"' More importantly, it noted that neither the court of appeals nor the district
court "in addressing themselves to the remedial plan mandated by
the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals, addressed itself to the
inquiry required by our opinion in . . .Dayton."'92 The Court then
188. Id. at 249.
189. Brinkman A at 13.
190. 389 F. Supp. 293 (D. Neb. 1974), rev'd, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 946 (1975).
191. 45 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. June 28, 1977) (per curian).
192. Id.
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repeated the equation requiring a determination of incremental segregative effect.
93
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented.'
Similarly, the Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals in Brennan v. Armstrong,9 ' once again referring the lower
court to the Dayton standard.
A difficulty which remains for lower courts attempting to apply
this standard is that the Court has not described the mechanics for
doing so. The quandary which now faces lower courts is how they
are to go about determining the incremental effect of segregative
actions or inaction by a school board. While it is relatively easy to
determine the current level of segregation, the Court also requires
the determination of what the pattern of segregation would have
been had the constitutional violations not occurred. This requirement would appear to attribute to lower court judges the gift of
retrospective prophesy, an exercise long the favorite of science fiction writers fascinated by fantasies of incredible time machines, but
hardly an appropriate mode of judicial inquiry in the area of a
sensitive constitutional right. In view of the theoretical and practical difficulties of determining what might have been, it is only logical to conclude that the intention of the Court in creating this standard was to ensure that courts would no longer order massive transportation of students in desegregation litigation.
While language in earlier desegregation decisions describing the
equitable powers of the court had emphasized their breadth, the
new emphasis is clearly on their characteristic of balancing,
"adjusting and reconciling . . . public and private needs.'' 9 As
Justice Powell, whose influence can be strongly felt in recent Supreme Court decisions, stated in Keyes, "In the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable decree, transportation orders should be applied with special caution to any proposal
as disruptive of family life and interests-and ultimately of education itself-as extensive transportation of elementary-age children
solely for desegregation purposes.""' Powell concluded by calling for
193. Id. In Justice Brennan's opinion he declared that just as "Arlington Heights ...
" so Dayton merely "reaffirmed the already well-established
did not make new law ....
principle that the scope of the remedy must be commensurate with the scope of the constitutional violation."
194. 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. June
28, 1977) (per curiam).
195. 349 U.S. at 300.
196. 413 U.S. at 251.
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"a return to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests
of our society in achieving desegregation with other educational and
societal interests a community may legitimately assert. ' ' 91 7
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The shift by the Supreme Court to more rigorous standards in
desegregation litigation may be explained in several ways. Perhaps
it is the result of recent social science research which has cast doubt
upon the basic assumption in Brown that segregated education is
inherently inferior.' Perhaps it is the result of practical considerations derived from the experience of cities undergoing massive desegregation, which has resulted in violence, resistance to "forced
busing" by both blacks and whites, open racial hostility where none
was recognized before, allegations of "white flight" and the enormous expense of busing.
Perhaps, as one commentator noted after the Milliken decision,
the Court has simply recognized "that the problem of providing
equal educational opportunities to all defies a legal solution based
solely on a race theory of equal protection . . . perhaps the . . .
effort to implement the promise of Brown has, in fact, reached its
99
logical conclusion.'1
And perhaps, most appropriately, the recent shift is based on
principled constitutional grounds which the Burger Court appears
to view as requiring judicial restraint by the Supreme Court. The
present retreat from the judicial activism of the Warren Court reflects a belief, shared by the district court in Dayton, that it is
inappropriate to "advance by judicial fiat . . . [a] social philosophy, however benign."' "" Perhaps "there are aspirations of a peaceful and happy society that do not rise to a constitutional level and
are therefore not attainable in a court of law. 2 01
197.

Id. at 253.
See, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (Winter 1975). This symposium issue was devoted
to a discussion of the relationship between social science and the judicial response to school
198.

desegregation. The foreword mentions several publications which shattered the "simplistic
faith that merely reassigning bodies to different schools would bring about equality .
Id. at 2.
The effectiveness of busing as a desegregation tool has also become a controversial issue.
"[Blusing hasn't worked ....
The evidence is substantial that busing is leading away from
integration and not toward it; that it has not significantly improved the quality of education
accessible to blacks . . . that it has not contributed to racial harmony but has produced deep
fissures within American society." Cousins, Busing Reconsidered, SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan. 24,
1976, at 4, col. 1.
199. Read, supra note 4, at 48.
20Q. Brinkman C at 3.
201. Id. at 4.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss1/7

19781

COMMENT

While it is difficult to ascertain the intent of the Court in defining these new more rigorous standards, their effect will be that
plaintiffs will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to produce sufficient evidence to require a systemwide remedy which includes mass transportation of students to achieve racial balance. In
Dayton, for example, it is likely that the busing plan now in effect
will be lifted and replaced with a plan which, at best, will approximate the plan adopted by the district court after the second remand
by the court of appeals.' 2 As a result, substantial racial imbalance
will be restored to the Dayton schools and a prediction made in
1975, which appeared invalid following implementation of the desegregation order, will accurately reflect the Dayton school system
in 1978. It will be accurate to state that "there are very few differences now in race relations between such towns as Jackson, Mississippi and Dayton, Ohio, except that, because of massive desegregation orders, Jackson's schools are probably now more integrated

than Dayton's. ''203
Thus, an important ramification of the Court's current standard is that it eliminates the goal of a uniform constitutional approach to the national problem of school desegregation urged by
Justice Powell in Keyes.204 Not only will the apparent sectional disparity in degree of integration between the North and the South be
more firmly entrenched, 0 " but a new disparity will develop between
202. The elements of the plan are discussed supra, note 138. Although at the time of
this writing no definite decision has been made, the district court has taken several preliminary steps. The Supreme Court remanded the case with orders to continue the current plan
for the 1977-78 school year, "subject to such further orders of the District Court as it finds
warranted following the hearings mandated by this opinion." 97 S. Ct. at 2776. On August 8,
1977, the court held a hearing at which the plaintiffs requested additional time to prepare.
Subsequently, the court filed an order maintaining the current plan for the first semester and
scheduling a hearing for October 15, 1977.
Due to a conflict in the court's schedule, that hearing was postponed until November
1st. The school board has stated publicly that the delay has not prevented the possibility of
adopting a new plan in January, 1978, should the court decide to lift the current plan.
203. Read, supra note 4, at 47.
204. 413 U.S. at 219.
205. This disparity was already obvious in 1972, see Karst, Not One Law at Rome and
Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH.
U.L.Q. 383. The author stated:
[A] distinction which makes northern plaintiffs prove a school board's illicit motive,
but which assumes a southern board's bad faith, deserves rejection because it mocks
the ideal of a national Constitution. It places the courts in the indefensible position of
telling northern blacks that they are entitled to a lesser degree of judicial vigilance on
behalf of their constitutional rights, and at the same time telling southern whites that
... Id. at 397.
they have been consigned to a moral limbo.
Predicting that the Supreme Court would find racial motives largely on the basis of evidence
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northern school systems which have already complied with massive
desegregation orders and those in which litigation is pending or not
yet begun. Desegregation doctrine in 1977, in effect, represents a
return to the Briggs interpretation of Brown, popular in the South
in the 1950's and 1960's.2"' The Constitution is now being construed
to require the elimination of deliberate segregation but not to require affirmative steps toward integration.
Margo Evans
of racially discriminatory effect, the author continued:
If the Court proves me wrong . . . then it will be making a mistake that is truly
grievous.
. . . If the Fourteenth Amendment is interpreted to be a regionally selective
command, we shall all be the poorer.
. . . A system that provides one law at Rome and another at Athens need not be
respected as a higher law.

Id. at 404.
206.

See discussion of Briggs' view of Brown note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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